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Wayne Klomp *
[W]E MUST NEVER FORGET, THAT IT IS A CONSTITUTION WE ARE EXPOUNDING.
I
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts generally consider fundamental constitutional rights as sacrosanct,
requiring heightened scrutiny before allowing the right to be relinquished.2
The right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution is a
long-standing tradition and unique guarantee afforded residents of the United
States.3 Generally, one who seeks redress under the law has the option to
request a trial by jury of one's peers for cases involving more than twenty
dollars and for which the common law recognizes a right to a jury trial.4
Although the Seventh Amendment has not been "incorporated" to apply to the
individual states, state constitutions generally provide for some form of the
right to trial by jury.5
In an effort to avoid trial by jury, some contracting parties include jury
waiver provisions.6 According to the needs of the business and the changes in
law and economic conditions, the structure of the jury waiver provision
changes. With the change in structure of the clause, enforcement standards also
change,7 resulting in confusion in the courts and among contracting parties, and
prompting controversy among the scholars.'
The terms "jury trial provision" and "jury waiver" as used in this note
include any contractual waiver that results in waiver of a jury trial right. "Jury
* J. D. candidate 2006, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
2 See, e.g., Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937) (The Court
will not presume acquiescence of a fundamental right.).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
I ld. Pertinent text reads "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ...." Id.
' See Randy J. Holland, State Jury Trials and Federalism: Constitutionalizing Common
Law Concepts, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 373 (2004).
6 For a discussion of rationales for waiving jury trial rights, see infra Part III.A.
7 See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 669 (2001).
8 At the center of this controversy are Professor Stephen Ware and Professor Jean Ster-
nlight, each advocating alternative views for conforming the analysis for enforcement of jury
waiver clauses. Compare Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and
Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167
(2004), with Sternlight, supra note 7.
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trial clause" will refer to a specific clause in a contract that specifically and
unequivocally expresses waiver of the right.
Part II of this Note surveys the various forms that jury waivers take and
the subsequent standards for enforceability. Courts divide enforcement of jury
provisions according to the type of waiver, predispute or postdispute. Predis-
pute waivers are further grouped according to their implicit and explicit con-
struction. Courts will enforce jury waiver provisions according to the category
into which the jury waiver provision falls.9 Differences in enforcement of vari-
ous jury waivers place the stability and predictability of these waivers into a
quagmire.
Part III briefly reviews the need for uniformity and recounts the positions
taken by advocates for uniform enforcement. In the interest of judicial effi-
ciency, constitutional integrity, and general predictability, courts must uni-
formly enforce jury waiver provisions. Some advocate for uniformity of
enforcement of jury waivers by arguing for a blanket application of the know-
ing consent standard generally applied to waiver of constitutional rights.1 ° On
the other side of the controversy are proponents for a uniform application of
contract law to jury waiver provisions," an application that does not require
knowing consent.
The analysis in Part IV compares court treatment of contractual waivers of
fundamental liberties and constitutional rights with treatment of jury waiver
provisions. In addition to those rights identified by other scholars, 12 courts and
legislatures require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent for waiver of other
fundamental rights, including waiver of parental rights through surrogacy con-
tracts and the First Amendment right to petition the government. Principles
taken from case law and statutes should be uniformly applied to contractual
waiver of all fundamental rights, including the right to a jury trial. Part V
concludes that a universal standard for enforcement of contractual waivers is
necessary for protection of our fundamental liberties.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Types of Jury Trial Waivers
A litigant may waive the right to a jury trial either through a pre-dispute
contract provision, or by waiver after a dispute arises. Post-dispute waivers
may be performed according to the rules of civil procedure. 3 Federal Rule 38
provides that a party may secure a jury trial by filing a jury trial demand and
completing proper service on opposing parties. 14 Parties may waive the right
9 See infra Part III.
10 See Sternlight, supra note 7.
11 See Ware, supra note 8.
12 See Sternlight, supra note 7, at 678 n.40 (pointing to the requirement of a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent standard for waiver of due process rights).
"3 See FED. R. Civ. P. 38-39. State rules of civil procedure generally contain similar waiv-
ers of jury trials. See, e.g., NEV. R. Civ. P. 38-39.
14 FED. R. Civ. P. 38.
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by inadvertently or purposefully failing to file, or upon consent of both parties
after filing the demand.' 5
Other post-dispute waivers are made contractually for consideration. Post-
dispute jury trial waivers take several forms including releases,' 6 contracts not
to sue, 17 and plea negotiations.' 8 Although the form of each waiver differs and
other constitutional rights are potentially involved, the effect is the same: the
litigant who obtained a current right to a jury trial waived that right.
Post-dispute jury waivers between parties are enforced almost universally
under a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent standard.1 9 This uniformity of
enforcement may be due to the position of the parties once a dispute has sur-
faced. Parties at odds with one another are more likely to be wary of entering
into agreements or relinquishing rights.20
However, parties may also opt to waive their right to trial by jury before a
dispute arises in a contractual pre-dispute provision. Business entities con-
stantly seek innovative methods to limit their liability and expense in any given
transaction while simultaneously preserving predictability. 2 When a dispute
arises, a business entity's best interest dictates that it be able to predictably
resolve the outcome in the most economic fashion possible.22 One functional
'5 FED. R. Civ. P. 38-39.
16 See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974) (waiver of a
legal claim, and therefore the right to a jury trial, must be knowing and voluntary).
17 See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987) (Plaintiff agreed during
criminal plea negotiations not to bring a civil suit in exchange for city dropping criminal
charges. Plaintiff filed civil suit after charges were dismissed. Supreme Court held that
agreement between city and Plaintiff was valid, implicitly waiving any right to jury trial
plaintiff may have had prior to the agreement.).
18 See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (criminal defendant must voluntarily
and understandingly enter guilty plea, implicitly waiving any right to a jury trial).
19 "Almost universally" may be an understatement. I have uncovered no current cases
which held a post-dispute release valid under other than a derivative of the knowing, volun-
tary, and intelligent standard. See, e.g., Rumery, 480 U.S. at 397-98. This applies to an
agreement between the parties only. Some courts have explicitly stated that an inadvertent
waiver under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 need not be knowing, and intelligent. See,
e.g., Hiotis v. Sherman Distributors of Md., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 217, 219 (D.D.C. 1984).
However, in a case where a party might have made a jury trial demand and failed, Federal
Rule 39 states that a federal court may use its discretion in granting such a right. FED. R.
Civ. P. 39(b). Courts typically should grant a late motion for a jury trial "in the absence of
strong and compelling reasons to the contrary." Hiotis, 607 F. Supp. at 219 (quoting
Pinemont Bank v. Belk, 722 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1984)).
20 See David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted
Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35
U. RicH. L. REv. 1085, 1085 & n.2 (2002). The authors point out that after litigation begins,
parties rarely have unequal bargaining power and are much more wary of the other, render-
ing a dispute over the validity of a post-dispute agreement over choice of venue much easier
to analyze.
21 See Bank South, N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 801 (Ga. 1994) (Sears-Collins, J.,
dissenting).
22 Edward Wood Dunham, Enforcing Contract Terms Designed to Manage Franchisor
Risk, 19 FRANCHIsE L.J. 91, 91 (2000) (applying the principle of predictability to franchises
generally).
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method for accomplishing this task has been to avoid allowing claims to go to a
jury.,
3
Business entities, particularly larger businesses, assume that juries are
prejudiced against them and more sympathetic to a class of injured plaintiffs. 4
Although statistics suggest that in civil suits, juries are less likely than judges or
lawyers to make large awards to plaintiffs, businesses apparently prefer to fol-
low the misperception by depending on arbitrators and judges for lower
awards." In an effort to avoid jury trials, contracts often include clauses that
prohibit a litigant's right to a jury trial. These contractual jury trial waivers,
when enforceable, may be an effective method of eliminating the potential risks
that juries present.2 6 Judicial enforcement of these jury waivers is critical to
the purposes for which business employ them: predictability and economic
efficiency.
Although most courts do not recognize the distinction they have created,
they have divided contractual, pre-dispute jury trial waivers into two categories
in analyzing whether the waivers are enforceable: explicit jury trial waivers
and implicit jury trial waivers.27 An explicit waiver is just what it purports to
be, an explicit phrase in a contract indicating that the parties agree that if a
dispute should arise, they agree not to exercise the constitutional right to a jury
trial2 8 (referred to herein as a "jury waiver clause").
Implicit waivers are more subtle and usually do not contain any type of
language indicating that a party is waiving a constitutional right.29 Although
enforcement of the provision effectuates a jury waiver, the direct purpose of an
implicit waiver may or may not be forfeiture of a jury trial right.30 For exam-
ple, an arbitration clause, the most common form of implicit jury waiver, typi-
cally indicates only that a dispute will be subject to arbitration and not that the
party actually waives the right to a jury trial. Although some arbitration clauses
explicitly waive the right to a jury trial, arbitration clauses nearly always
implicitly waive the Seventh Amendment or equivalent state right to a jury trial
since they remove a dispute from the jurisdiction of the courts.3 '
23 Id. at 95-96.
24 Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in State Civil Cases, 42 A.L.R.
5TH 53, § 2 (1996).
25 Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Impli-
cations for Reform, 50 BuFF. L. REV. 103, 126-29 (2002).
26 Christopher M. Cobb, Note, A Survey on Contractual Waiver of Civil Jury Trials in Flor-
ida, 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 329, 330-31 (2001).
27 1 am not aware of any court that has knowingly made this distinction in determining
whether to enforce a jury waiver provision, although some courts recognize arbitration
clauses as an implicit jury waiver. E.g., Marsh v. First U.S.A. Bank, N.A., 103 F. Supp. 2d
909, 921 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
28 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Ajax Navigation Corp., 881 F. Supp. 906, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(contract of adhesion on passenger ticket of cruise line limited action to trial without a jury).
29 See, e.g., Cooper v. M.R.M Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2004) (loss of fight to a
jury trial is an obvious consequence to enforcement of an arbitration provision).
30 See, e.g., Ware, supra note 8, at 190-91 & n.147.
31 Marsh, 103 F. Supp.2d at 921-22. The Marsh court found that a Seventh Amendment
right is not implicated in arbitration clauses since the right is subsequent to the federal court
system having jurisdiction over the party. Id. Arbitration clauses remove the fight to adjudi-
cate a dispute through the federal forum. Id.
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Enforcement of other pre-litigation agreements may also waive the right to
a jury trial.32 Professor Stephen J. Ware33 points to several types of clauses
and agreements that, when enforced, may have a residual effect of depriving
parties of a trial by jury. 34 His list of pre-litigation waivers of fundamental
rights includes contractual waivers, 35 forum-selection clauses, consent-to-juris-
diction clauses, as well as arbitration agreements.3 6 Other methods of waiving
jury trial rights include choice of law provisions standing alone as well as
choice of law provisions used in conjunction with explicit jury waiver
clauses.3 7
Arbitration clauses are the most common form of implicit jury trial waiv-
ers because every enforced arbitration clause waives a jury38 whereas a choice
of forum clause, choice of law provision, or other implicit jury waiver may
result in loss of right to jury trial.39 Since arbitration clauses are the most
commonly enforced implicit waivers, a significant volume of case law regard-
ing their enforcement has developed' while case law analyzing the interaction
between forum-selection clauses and jury waivers has not developed as fully.
This inherent disparity compels the structure of this analysis to be weighted to
arbitration cases.
B. Enforcement of Jury Waiver Provisions
Most courts enforce contractual jury waivers using either a fundamental
rights "knowing consent" analysis or a basic contract law approach.4 '
Although some courts diverge from these two standards,42 they apply the same
general factors as the knowing consent standard or uphold clauses based gener-
ally on contract principles. Since knowing consent or contractual standards are
utilized most often, the enforcement controversy centers around these two stan-
dards 43 and comprise the bulk of this survey and analysis.
32 Ware, supra note 8, at 182-98.
33 Stephen J. Ware is a Professor of Law at the University of Kansas.
34 Ware, supra note 8, at 182-98.
31 Id. Professor Ware points out several forms of post-litigation agreements as well, but
focuses most of his discussion on the pre-litigation waiver of constitutional fights. Id.
36 Id.
31 Smith v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., No. CIV.A.02-0481, 2004 WL 515769 (E.D. La.
Mar. 16, 2004). In Smith, a contract contained a choice of law provision applying New York
law as well as a jury waiver clause. In applying New York law, the court held that the jury
waiver was valid as to some claims under the terms of the contract, but not to others, such as
tort or contract claims not related to the agreement. Id.
31 See Cooper v. MRM Investment Co., 367 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2004).
39 By nature, these clauses do not oust jury rights unless the chosen forum or law does not
recognize a right to jury in that case. See Ware, supra note 8, at 190.
40 For a general survey of cases enforcing arbitration clauses see Sternlight, supra note 7,
and Jean R. Stemlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the
Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 17, 26-33 (2003).
41 See Sternlight, supra note 7.
42 See Stemlight, supra note 40, at 26-33.
13 See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 7, and Ware, supra note 8.
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1. Two Standards for Enforcing Jury Waiver Provisions
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to a jury trial is a funda-
mental, constitutional right."a Courts are hesitant to enforce contractual waiv-
ers of fundamental rights unless they are voluntary, knowing, intelligent and
intentional or some derivative thereof.45 This test is a result of: 1) the applica-
tion of the knowing and intelligent standard to criminal waivers; 46 2) the
Supreme Court holding and dicta in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. that the
standard applied to fundamental rights;47 and 3) a presumption against waiver
of a constitutional right.
48
In order to determine whether the party knowingly and voluntarily entered
a jury trial waiver, a court will analyze various factors4 9 summarized by Profes-
sor Jean R. Sternlight. 50 These factors generally include the following: 1)
negotiability of the waiver; 2) conspicuousness of the waiver; 3) disparity of
bargaining power between parties; and 4) business or professional experience
and sophistication of the party opposing the waiver.5 ' Courts are more likely to
44 Nat. Equip. Rental, Ltd., v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1939)).
15 Although the Supreme Court has never expressly extended the criminal waiver standard
of knowing, voluntary, and intelligent to civil matters, lower courts have done so consist-
ently based on dicta in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1972). See
Doe v. Marsh, 105 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff's knowingly and
intelligently waived right to privacy); Lake James Comty. Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Burke
County, 149 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 1998) (due process rights may be waived when knowing,
voluntary, and in the public interest); Gonzalez v. County of Hildago, 489 F.2d 1043 (5th
Cir. 1973) (waiver of fight to notice and hearing must be knowing and intelligent). See also
Sternlight, supra note 7, at 678-79 & n.40-49.
'6 D.H. Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 185-86.
47 Id.
48 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389 (1937).
41 Sternlight, supra note 7, at 680-89.
50 Jean R. Sternlight is the Saltman Professor of Law at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas William S. Boyd School of Law. She is also the Director of the Saltman Center for
Conflict Resolution.
51 Professor Stemlight discusses each of these factors in a thorough analysis. Sternlight,
supra note 7, at 680-89. I have repeated the factors she identified using Morgan Guar. Trust
Co. v. Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Using other cases, she has produced
virtually the same factors including: 1) visibility and clarity of the waiver (conspicuous-
ness); 2) knowledge and economic power of the parties in relation to each other (disparity of
bargaining power); 3) voluntariness of the agreement (negotiability); and 4) fairness of the
agreement (experience and sophistication of the party). Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the
Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh
Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L.
REv. 1, 57-58 (1997). My research has uncovered no additional factors that courts generally
consider when performing the knowing consent standard although alterations in facts may
warrant additional analysis. E.g., Reggie Packing Co. v. Lazere Fin. Corp., 671 F. Supp. 571
(N.D. I11. 1987) (uses knowing consent standard but includes analysis and explanation of
successive contract holders bound by same terms of contract). However, this four-step
approach has been critiqued by Professor Richard Reuben as begging the question of volun-
tariness. Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 949, 1021-22 (2000). Reuben
proposes an alternative three step approach by removing the degree of voluntariness factor
leaving: "(1) the visibility and clarity of the waiver .... (2) the general contractual environ-
ment in which the waiver was secured, and (3) the specific facts and circumstances of the
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enforce negotiated and conspicuous clauses between sophisticated parties on
equal footing. 2
The second approach to enforcement, a contract-based approach, is also
recognized by a number of courts enforcing jury waiver provisions.5 3 The
standard for enforcement consists of basic contractual principles: the clause is
presumed enforceable unless the party seeking its nullification can show the
jury waiver was the result of fraud, duress, or unconscionability, 4 This lower
standard predictably yields enforcement of many more jury waiver provisions.
2. Enforcement of Jury Waiver Clauses
Unfortunately, enforcement of jury waiver provisions is not uniform based
on either a survey of federal and state courts or based on the type of waiver.55
Courts will generally employ both of the enforcement regimes based on the
type of provision before it at the moment. 6 Fortunately, there is general agree-
ment in federal courts for applying the knowing consent standard to explicit
jury trial clauses in both contracts of adhesion as well as negotiated contracts.57
This general uniformity of standard is complexified, however, by a circuit split
regarding who bears the burden to show the waiver was knowing and intelli-
gent, the party seeking enforcement or the litigant vying for the jury trial
right.58
State courts, in large part, follow the federal analysis for jury waiver
clauses, enforcing explicit waivers that are knowing, voluntary, and intelli-
gent. 59 At least two states, however, have refused to enforce all explicit,
predispute jury waivers. 6' The two state supreme courts held jury waiver's per
se invalid on generally the same grounds: a constitutional right is inviolate in
the absence of explicit state statutes authorizing a predispute jury waiver.6 '
The Georgia court held all predispute jury waivers invalid because the Georgia
Constitution contemplates that jury waiver would be post-dispute in open
court.
6 2 The intermediate court in California recognized that the sophisticated
parties knowingly entered into the agreement containing an explicit jury waiver
actual bargaining over the waiver." Id. at 1022. The difference between the approaches is
almost entirely semantic, Reuben having only generalized the factors for voluntariness rather
than specifically identifying the types of considerations.
52 Sternlight, supra note 7, at 680-89.
53 Ware, supra note 8, at 197-98.
5' Id. at 170. Formation is also a requisite, but is so obvious as to evade warranting
discussion.
15 Id. Professor Ware's research indicates that contractual waivers of fundamental rights
are upheld on contractual standards as often as a knowing consent standard. Id.
56 See Sternlight, supra note 7.
57 Id. at 693-94.
58 Deborah J. Matties, Note, A Case for Judicial Self-Restraint in Interpreting Contractual
Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Court, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 431, 432 (1997).
59 Sternlight, supra note 40, at 24-25 & n.48.
60 Grafton Partners LP v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), aff'd,
116 P.3d 479 (Cal. 2005); Bank South, N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. 1994).
61 Grafton Partners, 116 P.3d at 485 (holding that because the California Constitution
allowed waiver in civil trial only as allowed by statute and no statute allowed predispute
waivers, any such waiver is invalid); Bank South, 444 S.E.2d at 800.
62 Bank South, 444 S.E.2d at 800.
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clause.6 3 The intermediate court and supreme court both concluded, however,
that the California Constitution barred enforcement of the clause, or any jury
trial waiver, except "in the manner to be prescribed by law." 64 The only statute
prescribing jury trial waiver "by law" included six prescribed methods for
waiving the right to jury trial.65 The court found that it did not have the consti-
tutional authority to recognize an additional form of waiver, and so could not
enforce the explicit jury waiver clause.66
3. Enforcement of Implicit Jury Waiver Provisions
Enforcement of implicit waivers has been problematic at best and other-
wise quite devoid of consistency. Courts enforce implicit jury waivers other
than arbitration clauses almost entirely through general contract law princi-
ples. 67 After the Supreme Court decisions in the landmark cases of Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute6 8 and MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. ,69 fed-
eral courts followed suit by enforcing choice of forum clauses and choice of
law clauses according to the standards set out in those cases.7 ° In Carnival
Cruise the Court enforced a forum-selection clause based on a reasonableness
standard citing, economic benefit to both cruise line and vacationer.7 '
However, one island of implicit jury waivers that has been preserved by
the Supreme Court from enforcement by contractual standards is "property dep-
rivation cases."7 2 In D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., the Supreme Court
enforced an implicit jury waiver provision against a corporation. 73 Several
months later in Fuentes v. Shevin, the same Court refused to enforce what
amounted to an implicit jury waiver against a consumer.74 The significant dif-
ference between the cases was the bargaining power75 of the parties seeking to
63 Grafton Partners, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 513.
4 Id. at 514 (quoting CAL. CONST. OF 1849, art. I, § 3).
65 Id. at 516.
66 Id. at 521.
67 See Ware, supra note 8, at 188-97.
68 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
69 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
70 The Court in Carnival Cruise Lines subjected forum-selection clauses to "judicial scru-
tiny for fundamental fairness" including factors such as whether the clause appeared reason-
able and whether parties were given notice of the clause. 499 U.S. at 595. For a survey of
those cases and subsequent court decisions see John McKinley Kirby, Consumer's Right to
Sue at Home Jeopardized Through Forum Selection Clause in Carnival Cruise Lines v.
Shute, 70 N.C. L. REV. 888 (1992).
71 Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 593-94.
72 Ware, supra note 8, at 182. Professor Ware analyzes Professor Sternlight's interpretation
of two Supreme Court cases analyzing property deprivation cases in which a contractual
waiver of due process rights could have resulted in the waiver of a jury trial. Id. See Ster-
nlight, supra note 51, at 51; D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (plurality opinion).
" D.H. Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 186-87.
7' Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 95.
71 Although this is just one of the factors courts typically use to determine enforceability, it
is perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the two cases. See infra notes 49-52 and
accompanying text.
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nullify the provision implicitly waiving a jury trial.7 6 Despite these proximate
cases, the federal courts struggle to apply Supreme Court precedent in a mean-
ingful or consistent manner.
Application of the law to arbitration clauses has, however, been inconsis-
tent among federal and state courts. 7 Professor Sternlight distinguishes state
court's enforcement of arbitration clauses on the basis of whether courts ana-
lyze a fundamental right to jury trial and whether the court upholds the
clause. 8 Courts relying on a fundamental rights analysis to reject arbitration
clauses have done so with various standards including knowing and intelligent,
voluntary relinquishment, and clear and unambiguous.79 Other courts analyze
the fundamental jury right, but determine that the right to a jury did not arise
either because the Constitution did not grant a civil jury trial right or because
the right did not arise since the dispute never "invoke[d] a judicial forum."8 °
Sternlight calls the latter form of reasoning "clearly circular," indicating that
the courts should use the knowing consent or fundamental rights standard to
determine whether parties have knowingly selected an alternative forum.8
Those courts which reject a knowing consent standard or derivative
thereof generally apply contract principles to enforcement of implicit jury
waivers.82 Professor Sternlight points out that state courts avoiding a funda-
mental rights analysis also generally enforce arbitration agreements under con-
tractual standards.83 She suggests that if these courts had considered the
fundamental right to a jury trial, the consent to arbitrate clauses would have
been upheld in most of the cases involving sophisticated parties since the
knowing consent standard presumes that businesses posses sufficient knowl-
edge to be bound contractually.8 4
Federal enforcement of arbitration clauses is generally more uniform in
applying the standards to determine enforceability. 85 For explicit jury trial
waivers, federal courts will normally follow the fundamental rights' "knowing
consent" standard including the basic factors associated with it.86 By contrast,
in predispute arbitration agreements, federal courts commonly apply a contrac-
tual analysis.8 7 However, some federal courts applying the contractual stan-
dard analyze at least some of the factors associated with the knowing consent
standard including bargaining position of the parties, sophistication of business,
76 For a more thorough analysis of these cases, see infra notes 126-35 and accompanying
text.
77 See Stemlight, supra note 7; Stemlight, supra note 40.
78 Sternlight, supra note 40, at 24-33.
79 Id. at 26-29.
80 Id. at 29-31.
81 Id. at 23.
82 See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Broadnax, 827 P.2d 531 (Colo. 1992).
83 Sternlight, supra note 40, at 31-33, n.90.
84 Id. at 32.
85 Stemlight, supra note 7, at 695. Professor Stemlight recognizes that some courts use the
federal presumption favoring arbitration to make arbitration enforcement even more lenient
than contractual enforcement principles. Id. at 696.
86 Id. at 693.
87 Id. at 695-96.
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and the conspicuousness.8 8 Even after reviewing these factors, the courts
applying a contractual standard generally reject unenforceability claims. 89
III. THREE CHEERS FOR UNIFORMITY
A. The Need for Uniformity
The purpose of predispute agreements, including implicit or explicit jury
waivers, is to provide the parties with the best economic, efficient, and predict-
able dispute resolution possible. 90 These efficiency purposes of such agree-
ments do not inherently consider the fundamental right to a jury trial as a
constitutional principle, but rather as a factor to determine higher costs and
level of unpredictability. 91 The purpose of a choice of law provision, for exam-
ple, is to employ that choice of law doctrine which will select law likely to
resolve disputes in favor of the drafter.92 The general underlying rationale, at
least for the drafter, is efficiency as it relates to predictability and economics
and not merely to avoid a jury.93 Simply put, when a dispute arises, a business
entity wants to know it is getting the best benefits of the law while preserving
the stability of predicting the outcome.
Therefore, perhaps the strongest argument for uniformity is judicial con-
sistency in applying a predictable law. In order to preserve the purpose of these
pre-dispute agreements, society needs solidarity, consistency, and predictability
in the law. If, for example, a corporation uses an arbitration clause in a form
contract, it needs to know that it will be enforced. If it must engage in pretrial
litigation to enforce the clause, costs rise. If the agreement is not upheld, the
purpose has been negated and the time, research and preparation in preparing
the agreement according to the law will have been wasted.
Additionally, common citizens must be able to predict court decisions in
order to conform to societal expectations. 94 One standard for enforcement of
constitutional rights is much easier understood and much more likely to be
known by the average citizen than separate standards for each type of right and
various forms of waiver. Even if in the quest for uniformity, legislatures or
courts determine that any contractual waiver of a jury trial is uniformly
enforceable, at least such a decision would be comprehensible and functional
for all segments of society.
88 Id. at 699-705.
89 Id.
90 See Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 20, at 1085-87.
1 Jury trials are often seen as more costly and unpredictable. See supra text accompanying
notes 24-26.
92 See, e.g., George F. Carpinello, Testing the Limits of Choice of Law Clauses: Franchise
Contracts as a Case Study, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 57, 59 (1990) (using franchise contracts as an
example of how franchisors use choice of law clauses to "opt out of the protective legisla-
tion" adopted in the local jurisdiction in which the franchise is located).
93 Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1153 (2000).
9' Frederick Shauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 597-98 (1987).
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Another argument for uniformity is judicial efficiency. 95 If a court must
wade through piles of inconsistent decisions to determine enforceability of a
jury waiver, too much time is spent and efficiency is lost. It must take time to
receive briefs on the subject, perhaps hearing argument before a decision can
be made. Additionally, if a court must apply contractual standards to implicit
waivers, knowing consent standards to explicit waivers, and a more lenient
standard to arbitration clauses specifically, more room for error is created as is
more judicial inefficiency.
B. The Controversy
Two scholars on opposite sides of the issue have called for uniformity in
enforcement of jury trial waivers. Professor Jean Sternlight argues for applica-
tion of the knowing consent standard to arbitration clauses in particular;96 Pro-
fessor Stephen Ware argues to the contrary, that contractual standards should
apply to all jury waiver provisions.97 Additional calls for consistency come
from those analyzing the trend of the court. 98 Professor David Schwartz sug-
gests that in order for a Supreme "Court whose majority is supposed to be
leading a federalism revival, if not a federalism revolution," the current state of
the law-at least in arbitration clauses-is an embarrassment. 9 9 His call for
uniformity is, if nothing else, a call for consistency.
Despite the calls for a consistent application of federalist principles, the
main arguments addressed in this Note center around principles of statutory
interpretation and historical application of law. The dispute between which
standard courts should consistently apply-the knowing consent standard or
the contractual standard-revolve around statutory construction, including
plain language and legislative history, stare decisis, and constitutional law.
1. Statutory Interpretation
The first point of contention centers around the statutory interpretation of
section 2 of the FAA. The entire text reads:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof,
or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out
of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. 1oo
95 See generally LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform
Through Specialization for Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, 2002 UCLA
J.L. & TECH. 1.
96 See Stemlight, supra note 7; Sternlight, supra note 40; Sternlight, supra note 51; Jean R.
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).
17 See Ware, supra note 8; Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitra-
tion, and State Constitutional Jury-Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39 (2003).
98 David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The
Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 (2004).
99 See id.
'0 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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a. Cannons of Statutory Construction
Professor Ware takes the position that applying a knowing and voluntary
consent standard to section 2 would be inconsistent. Taking a plain language
approach, he argues that by its terms, section 2 reaches "any contract" and not
"any contract calling for waiver of a constitutional right."'' He takes the stat-
utory construction a step further arguing that Congress excluded specific clas-
ses from the FAA, thus exhibiting its intent not to exclude contractual waivers
of constitutional rights.10 2 Ware also points out that since Congress recently
considered adding more exceptions to the FAA, but declined to do so, it has
further expressed its intent not to exclude contractual waiver of constitutional
rights. i03
Even tentatively construing this statutory construction argument as valid,
Professor Sternlight indicates that if the courts interpret the FAA according to
Professor Ware's analysis, the FAA would be unconstitutional since "Congress
does not have the power to make binding arbitration agreements immune to
attack under the Seventh Amendment.'' Sternlight points out that the real
battle over which standard court should use applies mainly to contracts of adhe-
sion since other contracts likely meet the knowing consent standard anyway.'
She finds no problems with applying the knowing consent standard to contrac-
tual arbitration clauses since section 2 provides for enforcement "upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' 1 6 She
contends that "[a]ny contract calling for the waiver of a constitutional right,
including a jury trial right, must be examined to ensure that it is voluntary,
knowing and intelligent."' 0 7 Thus, there would be no conflict by interpreting
the FAA to include waivers of fundamental rights, so long as the courts ana-
lyzed the waiver for voluntariness.
b. Legislative History
Professor Ware calls for a continued interpretation of section 2 consistent
with the current trend to enforce arbitration clauses in "sophisticated" contracts
as well as contracts of adhesion. 10 8 Although the legislative history indicates
an awareness among legislators that the FAA may reach unsophisticated parties
through form contracts, Congress did not embody this concern in the Act, an
expression of intent not to exclude such contracts.'0 9 He also points out that if
courts required the knowing standard of consent, both sophisticated and unso-
101 Ware, supra note 8, at 177.
102 Id. at 180. He refers to section 1 which excludes "employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9
U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
'03 Ware, supra note 8, at 179-80 & n.75 (citing Marcia Coyle, Anti-arbitration Bills Set Off
Classic Brawl, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 2002, at A8).
"to Sternlight, supra note 7, at 718.
o5 Id. at 728.
106 Id. at 718.
107 Id.
108 Ware, supra note 8, at 176-80.
109 Id. at 179.
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phisticated litigants could raise the concern, and not just consumer contract of
adhesion cases."o
Professor Sternlight, however argues that the legislative history of the
FAA and the judicial history of the interpretation of the Act require a knowing
and voluntary standard of consent for waiver of fundamental rights.' Ster-
nlight argues that Congress never intended the FAA to be applied in adhesive
contractual situations as reflected in the legislative history.'1 2 Additionally,
early judicial interpretation reflected the view that the Act did not apply to
unknowing consumers who possessed little information compared to the
seller." 3 She buttresses this argument by pointing out that for the first thirty-
four years after its adoption, courts considered the act only applicable to federal
courts." 4 Finally, the types of cases that would call attention to the disparity in
enforcing adhesion contracts under the contractual standards of the Act did not
arise until the 1980s, thus courts recognized Seventh Amendment jury trial con-
cerns until that time.
1 5
2. Stare Decisis
The debate moves from discussion of FAA enforcement standards to
waiver of fundamental rights, both in the civil and criminal sense. Supporting
the knowing consent standard, Professor Stemlight cites criminal and civil
cases requiring various standards including "words such as knowing, voluntary,
and intentional."' 6 Although the Supreme Court has never weighed in on the
issue of what standard should apply for jury trial provisions, it "has consistently
employed the 'knowing, voluntary, intentional standard' for waivers of consti-
tutional rights in the criminal context.""'  She then lists several federal court
decisions which use various derivatives of the knowing consent standard in
reviewing jury trial waivers."' She does note, however, that the court applies
a knowing and intentional standard to waiver of the right to a jury trial." 9
Professor Ware criticizes the assertion that the Supreme Court consistently
uses a knowing consent standard in the criminal context of waiving constitu-
tional rights.' 2 0 He points to several rights in the criminal context which do not
require the strict scrutiny of the knowing consent standard including the right to
avoid self-incrimination and the right to be present at one's trial.'1
2
"1O Id. at 180.
.." Sternlight, supra note 7, at 729-30.
12 Sternlight, supra note 96, at 647-49.
113 Id. at 648.
114 Id. at 650.
"5 See id. at 653-63.
116 Sternlight, supra note 7, at 678.
1'7 Id. at 678 n.40.
1 8 Id. at 678-79.
"' Stemlight, supra note 51, at 51 & n.185.
120 Ware, supra note 8, at 181.
121 Id. Professor Ware quotes Professor Sternlight conceding that courts do not always
apply the knowing consent or similar standard to all fundamental rights in the criminal con-
text. Id. Unfortunately, he notes the wrong article in which she conceded the point (the
correct citation is: Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 50 n.185 (1997)), and fails to
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He also distinguishes criminal constitutional rights from civil, indicating
that the knowing consent standard as used in criminal law may not apply; rather
the Court appears to adjudicate civil waivers using contract principles."' 2 To
illustrate this point, Professor Ware draws on examples from several civil cases
in which courts upheld implicit waivers of constitutional rights based on con-
tract principles.' 2 3 As has been mentioned, courts generally use contract prin-
ciples to enforce forum-selection clauses, consent to jurisdiction clauses, and
some property deprivation cases in which jury trial or due process rights are
waived. 12
4
Another point of contention between the two sides of the debate are the
Supreme Court cases dealing most directly with the explicit issue of contractual
waiver of constitutional rights. In D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., the Court
upheld a contractual waiver of due process rights in a cognovit.125 A cognovit
allows a creditor to obtain a judgment against a debtor without notice or hear-
ing. 12 6 Overmyer signed the cognovit in an effort to renegotiate a loan after
defaulting on the loan.' 27 The court "h[e]ld that Overmyer ...voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly waived the rights it otherwise possessed to pre-
judgment notice and hearing, and that it did so with full awareness of the legal
consequences." '2 8 The Court noted that Overmyer was a corporation; the case
did not involve unequal bargaining power; and the contract was not one of
adhesion. 129
In contrast, several months later the Court refused to enforce similar con-
tractual language between a retailer and a consumer.1 30 In Fuentes v. Shevin, a
form contract entitled the consumer to possession or items purchased unless she
defaulted under the terms of the agreement.' 3 ' Under a claim of default, the
merchant obtained a writ of replevin before the consumer received a summons
or complaint. 132 In rendering the possession provision unenforceable, the
Court distinguished the facts from D.H. Overmyer stating that there was no
bargaining over the terms and the consumer was not made aware of the signifi-
cance of the default clause.' 3 3 However, the Court refused to explicitly lay out
mention that Professor Sternlight's research indicated that courts failed to apply a knowing
and intentional standard to some constitutional rights in the criminal context. Sternlight,
supra note 51, at 50 n.185. Sternlight points out that the Court has required the voluntary
and intelligent standard for some rights including "waivers of the right to counsel, the right
to a formal indictment before trial, the right to trial, and the right to trial by jury." Id.
122 Ware, supra note 8, at 182. Professor Ware properly attributes this argument to Edward
Rubin, although he substantiates the argument using contemporary illustrations. See Edward
L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 478 (1981).
123 Ware, supra note 8, at 182-97.
124 See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
121 D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972).
126 Id. at 176.
127 Id. at 180-81.
128 Id. at 187.
129 Id. at 186.
130 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (plurality opinion).
131 Id. at 70.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 95.
[Vol. 6:545
Winter 2005/2006] WAIVER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
the principles of waiver since the language in the contract did not amount to a
waiver. "'
Relying on D.H. Overnyer and Fuentes as precedent, Professor Stemlight
urges the Supreme Court to adopt the factors test' 3 5 in order to determine
whether some contractual waivers are enforceable.' 36 Professor Ware, on the
other hand, argues that the decisions in these cases have subsequently been
"curtailed" by later decisions.' 3 7 He points to Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. and
Connecticut v. Doehr to support this contention.138 These cases, however, deal
explicitly with constitutionality of statutes allowing attachment of liens to prop-
erty without a pre-deprivation hearing, and give only cursory information about
lien-granting contracts.1 39 Additionally, the Doehr Court renders unconstitu-
tional the statute allowing attachment with no hearing or due process rights. 4 °
Finally, subsequent opinions by Circuit and state courts refer not to Mitchell or
Doehr as precedent, but to D.H. Overmyer. Specifically, a plethora of lower
court decisions cite D.H. Overmyer as the controlling precedent for contractual
waiver of constitutional rights,"'4 including waiver of the right to a jury trial.142
3. Opposing Opinions
In light of the several areas of the law which apply contractual standards
to enforce contractual jury trial waivers, Professor Ware concludes by arguing
that the enforcement of explicit jury waivers ought to conform to the present
standard for enforcing other contractual waivers.' 43 Doing so, he asserts,
would require overruling no Supreme Court cases and very few lower court
decisions." 4 He states that applying the position Professor Sternlight advo-
134 Id.
135 See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
136 Stemlight, supra note 51, at 57-58. Professor Sternlight argues that the factors laid out
above should be used to determine enforceability of arbitration clauses specifically. Id.
137 Ware, supra note 8, at 184-87.
138 Id. See also Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Connecticut v. Doehr,
501 U.S. 1 (1991).
139 See Mitchell, 416 U.S. 600; Doehr, 501 U.S. 1.
140 Doehr, 501 U.S. at 24.
141 See, e.g., In re FRG, Inc., 919 F.2d 850, 856 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing D.H. Overmyer
as the standard for waiver of constitutional rights); Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853
F.2d 1084, 1094 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[Ilt is well settled that [waivers of constitutional rights]
must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent"); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752,
756 (5th Cir. 1985) (knowing and voluntary standard is the proper standard for enforcement
of contractual waiver of constitutional rights); Gonzalez v. Hidalgo County, 489 F.2d 1043,
1046 (5th Cir. 1973) (requiring knowing, voluntary, and intelligent standard and high burden
of proof for contractual waiver of constitutional right to notice and a hearing); Davies v.
Grossmant Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1394 (Cal. 1991) (recognizing knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent standard expressed in D.H. Overmyer); cf, e.g., Piercy v. Heyison,
565 F.2d 854, 858-59 (3d Cir. 1977) (limiting holding of D.H. Overmyer).
142 Nat'l Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258 ("It is elementary that the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury is fundamental and that its protection can only be relinquished
knowingly and intentionally.").
143 Ware, supra note 8, at 197-98. He also recognizes that perhaps different standards
should apply for enforcement of jury waiver clauses and arbitration clauses, maintaining the
status quo. Id. at 168 n.10.
'44 Id. at 205.
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cates would require: 1) overruling the holdings of the cases upholding contrac-
tual enforcement standards for forum-selection clauses and consent to
jurisdiction clauses; 2) casting doubt on case law upholding property-depriva-
tion cases involving waiver of fundamental rights; and 3) holding section 2 of
the FAA unconstitutional. ' 5 When the question arises, he considers it unlikely
that the Supreme Court will apply a knowing consent standard to a contractual
waiver of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 14 6
Professor Sternlight, on the other hand, recognizes no Supreme Court pre-
cedent that need be overruled in order to apply a knowing consent standard to
waiver of a fundamental right since the question has not come before the
court. 147 Arbitration clauses would not become void or obsolete, rather compa-
nies seeking to enforce them in arms-length contracts would likely meet the
knowing consent standard, while sophisticated parties seeking to enforce them
in contracts of adhesion would necessarily need to restructure the clause to
obtain a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. 148 She concludes by reas-
serting that the right to a jury trial is a constitutionally protected right and that
courts should strike arbitration clauses as unconstitutional. 149
IV. COMPARING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has established a universal stan-
dard for enforceability of contractual waivers of fundamental civil rights. This
failure has resulted in state and lower federal courts addressing these waivers
using varying standards, especially in jury waiver provisions. Additionally,
state legislatures have enacted contradicting statutes regarding enforcement of
contractual waivers of fundamental rights. However, the treatment of funda-
mental rights, such as the right to petition the government and parental rights to
the companionship of their children illustrate several general principles regard-
ing fundamental rights."15 First, the Supreme Court precedent for enforcement
145 Id.
146 Id.
141 Stemlight, supra note 7, at 730.
148 Id. at 727-28.
149 Id. at 733.
150 I select these rights for both their similarities to and differences from the jury trial
right-and because courts have ruled directly on whether these rights can be waived by
contract ex ante. The right to petition the government is more like the right to a jury trial
and could be described as a procedural, rather than a substantive right, although no Supreme
Court decision has done so. Compare United Mine Workers v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S.
217, 222 (1967) (right to petition the government for redress is among the most important
rights of the Bill of Rights); Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.3d 584, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1988) (right to
petition the government is substantive rather than procedural); and Allison v. Citgo Petro-
leum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1998) (characterizing constitutional right to jury
trial as "substantive rights and procedural complications"); with Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d
175, 177 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that right to a jury trial in criminal proceedings is funda-
mental procedural right); and Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 332 (5th Cir. 1989)
(in deportation proceedings, alien has Fifth Amendment procedural right to petition the gov-
ernment). Opponents of the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent standard might try to argue
that since the right to a jury trial is more procedural, courts need not give it as much protec-
tion as a procedural right. While this begs the question of whether a jury trial is purely
procedural, Courts are unlikely to follow this approach since the Supreme Court, without
[Vol. 6:545
Winter 2005/2006] WAIVER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
contractual waivers of fundamental rights is a knowing, voluntary, and intelli-
gent standard. Second, courts will not enforce the contractual waiver when it is
contrary to public policy. And third, the important right to freedom of contract
is secondary to fundamental rights. These principles illustrate that the best and
most practicable solution to the disparate treatment of jury waiver provisions is
blanket enforcement of contractual waivers of fundamental rights through a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent standard when the waiver is not contrary to
public policy.
This section illustrates these principles using judicial treatment of the enu-
merated constitutional right to petition as well as states' treatment of surrogacy
contracts waiving parental rights. Finally, a hypothetical elucidates the univer-
sality of these principles by applying them to a potential waiver of the right to
an abortion. The illustrations and hypothetical are intended to demonstrate that
the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent standard is universal for all contractual
waivers of fundamental rights, including jury waiver provisions.
A. Waiver of the Right to Petition the Government for Redress
A recent example of the federal courts' treatment of contractual waiver of
a constitutional right involves the right to petition the government for
redress.15' In Lake James Community Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. v.
Burke County, the dissolution of a volunteer fire department caused concern
among some citizens. 52 Certain areas of the larger community petitioned to be
included in separate fire districts, due to the inconsistency of the Lake James
Fire Department.' 53 Later, Burke County contracted with a newly reorganized
Lake James Fire Department for fire protection services.' 5 4 Due to the unrelia-
bility and problems including breach of contract in the past, the County
required a clause in the contract requiring the Fire Department to consent to the
previous petitions allowing certain areas of the community to remove them-
selves from the jurisdiction of control of the Fire Department.I55 The contract
approaching the argument of whether a procedural right lacks substance, has correctly recog-
nized that the right of a jury trial "is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reser-
vation of power in our constitutional structure." Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-
06 (2004) (Sixth Amendment jury trial right in criminal cases). Even if courts recognized
the jury trial right as merely procedural, neither the Constitution nor the courts have
expressly characterized procedural fundamental rights as meriting less protection than a sub-
stantive right.
The right of parents to the companionship of their children, however, is a purely sub-
stantive right. However, it is not enumerated by the Constitution, but has been recognized
by courts under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). Again, the Supreme Court has not differentiated
between enumerated and unenumerated, fundamental, constitutional rights. Thus, I compare
the right to a jury trial with the right to petition the government as an enumerated, potentially
procedural right and then contrast it with an unenumerated, substantive right. In both cases,
case law and prudence suggest using a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent standard for con-
tractual waiver.
5' U.S. CONST. amend. I.
152 149 F.3d 277, 279 (1998).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
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provided that any challenge in the judicial system or challenge to the legality of
the "Consent Provision" of the contract would constitute a breach of
contract. '
56
Although the Fire Department objected to the clause, it entered into the
contract.' 57 Five months later in an effort to obtain greater jurisdiction, the Fire
Department filed an action for declaratory relief requesting the court to vacate
the petitions that released certain areas from the jurisdiction of the Fire Depart-
ment. 1 58 The County counter-claimed for breach of contract and defended on
the ground that the Fire Department had waived its right to petition the court in
the matter.' 
59
Although the trial court held the contractual waiver void as unconstitu-
tional, the Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a three-part test. 160 In order to be
enforceable, "[t]he contractual waiver of a constitutional right must be a know-
ing waiver, must be voluntarily given, and must not undermine the relevant
public interest."'' 6  The Fourth Circuit attributed this test to three Supreme
Court cases including D.H. Overmyer.162 Applying the test to the facts of the
case, the Circuit Court concluded that the Fire Department knew of the clause
and voluntarily entered the agreement with the aid of counsel.' 63 Additionally,
due to the previous unreliability of the Fire Department, the court concluded
that the clause was not against public policy as the waiver was intended to
promote dependable fire protection to those communities affected by previousdifficulties. 16'
The test for waiving constitutional rights as applied by the Fourth Circuit
is a conjunctive test inclusive of both the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
standard as well as contractual enforcement standards according to public pol-
icy. This court's use of the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent standard is just
an example of the consistent trend of courts using this enforcement standard for
contractual waivers of constitutional rights.' 65 From the standpoint of the con-
stitutional view of the jury trial right, the different treatment for enforcement of
jury waiver provisions is inexplicable.
Just as the Fourth Circuit and many other courts have interpreted D.H.
Overmyer as the controlling precedent for contractual waiver of fundamental
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 279-80.
160 Id. at 280-81.
161 Id.
162 D.H. Overmyer Co., v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972). The court also cited Town
of Newton v. Rumery in which prosecutors agreed to drop tampering with a witness charges
against Rumery in exchange for a contractual waiver of the right to sue for violation of
constitutional rights. 480 U.S. 386, 389-91 (1987). Rumery later sued, but the Supreme
Court enforced the contractual waiver since it was not contrary to public policy and Rumery
entered the contract voluntarily, with the aid of counsel. Id. at 394, 398. The third case is a
criminal case that the Supreme Court remanded in order that the lower court might make a
determination as to whether the right involved had been voluntarily waived. Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469 (1938).
163 Lake James, 149 F.3d at 281.
164 Id. at 281-82.
165 See supra text accompanying note 142.
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rights, courts should use the same standard for waiver of jury trial rights. Even
if the there is an unambiguous public policy preference for enforcement of arbi-
tration clauses, for example, this only fulfills one portion of the test for waiver.
No Supreme Court precedent has held that public policy can overcome the
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent standard for waiver of a constitutional right.
Additionally, the treatment of contractual waivers illustrates that the
important interest of freedom of contract is inferior to fundamental rights.
16 6
Since the Lochner era, 16 7 courts have continually diminished the freedom of
the right to contract.1 68 Courts dealing with waivers other than a jury waiver
provision treat fundamental rights as more important than enforcing contractual
provisions. Lake James is just one example of many where the right to contract
beholden to a more strict standard than normal contractual enforcement princi-
ples. 169 Treatment of jury waiver provisions as different from other fundamen-
tal rights, in fact as subordinate to the "important interest" of freedom of
contract, is an unjustified reversion to Lochner.
Constitutional jury trial rights should be treated the same as other funda-
mental rights such as the right to petition the government. By enforcing jury
waiver provisions under other standards, courts are ignoring Supreme Court
precedent and confounding the issue.
B. Waiver of Parental Rights
Parental rights are another good illustration of the principles of contractual
waiver of a fundamental right. Certainly there are many differences between
parental rights and the right to trial by jury.17 0 However, for the purpose of
analogy, this section draws comparisons between the rights as fundamental
rights reserved to individuals under the Constitution. Both general analogies to
the broad principles underlying waiver of parental rights and specific examples
of waiver illustrate that relinquishment of fundamental rights should be limited
to a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent standard.
11 Some freedom of contract advocates argue that the constitutional right to freedom of
contract is an independent reason for upholding contractual jury waivers. See Joel Stout,
Note, The Indulgence of Reasonable Presumptions: Federal Court Contractual Civil Jury
Trial Waivers, 102 MICH. L. REv. 102 (2003); Kimberly A. Stout, Note, No Prelitigation
Contractual Waiver of Jury Trial: Bank South, N.A. v. Howard, a Step Backward for Geor-
gia, 12 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 929 (1996).
167 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
168 See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) ("The Constitution
does not speak of freedom of contract"); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 761
(1997) (Souter, J., concurring) ("[D]eviant economic due process cases ha[ve] been repudi-
ated" in reference to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Adkins v. Children's
Hospital ofD.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (overruled in part by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937))).
169 See supra text accompanying note 142.
170 For a discussion of the differences, see supra note 150.
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1. Historical Perspective of Parental Rights in Adoption and
Surrogacy Contracts
The Supreme Court has recognized the fundamental nature of the right of
parents to raise their children since 1923.171 Since Meyer, the Supreme Court
has decided a litany of cases supporting parents' fundamental rights regarding
procreation and child rearing under the protection of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 72 Although recently this liberty been subjected to
contractual waiver through the use of surrogacy contracts, 173 waiver of parental
rights through adoption proceedings has been extant for much longer.'
74
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of surro-
gacy contracts, state and federal courts' treatment of this important liberty
should mirror that of other fundamental rights.
Infertile couples who are not able to adopt children are most likely to enter
into a surrogacy contract. These couples contract with a surrogate mother to be
artificially inseminated with the husband's sperm or a fertilized zygote. The
surrogate mother agrees to carry the baby to term, give birth, and relinquish any
parental rights that would have been realized.' 75 Occasionally, however, the
birth mother may attempt to rescind her waiver of parental rights under the
contract and keep the baby.
176
Although controversy surrounding surrogacy contracts involve more than
waiver of a constitutional right,' 7 7 much of the controversy regarding these
agreements has been on the enforceability of the contract with respect to the
waiver of parental rights prior to the birth of the child. Historically, all fifty
states had adoption statutes prohibiting the birth mother from giving consent to
the adoption prior to the birth of the baby.178 While the standard for such
waivers remains a derivative of the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent stan-
dard, 17 9 recently, at least five states have adopted legislation allowing enforce-
171 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
172 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982);
Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925).
171 See generally Lisa L. Behm, Legal, Moral & International Perspectives on Surrogate
Motherhood: The Call for a Uniform Regulatory Scheme in the United States, 2 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 557 (1999).
174 For a discussion of the history of adoption laws in the United States, see Allison
Fleisher, Note, The Decline of Domestic Adoption: Intercountry Adoption as a Response to
Local Adoption Laws and Proposals to Foster Domestic Adoption, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 171 (2003). The first adoption law was adopted in Massachusetts in 1851
and required a judge to oversee the consent of the biological and adoptive parents. Id. at
174. "[B]y 1900, every state had [a] form of adoption law." Id.
175 See supra note 170, at 557.
176 See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
177 Other conflicts include whether payment of the surrogate mother constitutes baby sell-
ing, definitions of natural, legal, and genetic parentage, rights of surrogate mothers under the
equal protection clause, etc. See generally Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Validity and
Construction of Surrogate Parenting Agreement, 77 A.L.R. 4TH 70 (2004).
178 Sharon L. Tiller, Note, Litigation, Legislation, and Limelight: Obstacles to Commercial
Surrogate Mother Arrangements, 72 IOwA L. REV. 415, 427 (1987).
179 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1232 (Michie 2002) (requiring several procedures prior
to allowing consent to be given).
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ment of surrogate contracts regardless of when the surrogate mother consented
to waive her parental rights to the child.' 8 ° Other states have statutorily
rejected enforcement of surrogacy contracts completely, including Arizona,
Michigan, New York, North Dakota, and Utah.""' Still other states have left
enforcement up to the courts based on applicable adoption statutes and consti-
tutional provisions. Many court decisions render the contract unenforceable
based on the principle that a surrogate mother may not waive her parental rights
prior to the birth of the child. 1
8 2
In one case, Petitioner Whitehead and Respondent Stern entered into a
surrogacy agreement in which Mrs. Whitehead was to be artificially insemi-
nated with Mr. Stem's sperm.' 8 3 The litigants agreed that Whitehead would
carry the baby to term and thereafter terminate her parental rights, delivering
the baby to Mr. Stern.' 84
Whitehead appealed the decision of a trial level court which terminated
her parental rights under enforcement of a surrogacy contract, claiming that
enforcement violated "her constitutional right to the companionship of her
child."' 85 On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the contract
was invalid under both the statutes of the State of New Jersey and according to
public policy. 18 6 Under the statutory scheme, the court noted, inter alia, that
"[c]ontractual surrender of parental rights is not provided for in our statutes as
now written."' 8 7
The New Jersey Supreme Court found that Whitehead could not make a
voluntary and informed decision since a decision to waive parental (constitu-
tional) rights prior to the birth of a baby is "uninformed, and ... compelled by
a preexisting contractual commitment, the threat of a lawsuit, and the induce-
ment of a $10,000 payment."' 88 This is true even when the waiver is "know-
ing, voluntary and deliberat[e]." 189
The court goes on to suggest that consent is irrelevant in relation to con-
tractual waiver of fundamental rights.' 90 The court then lists several rights,
which cannot be purchased via contract. Employers, for example, cannot: con-
tract to buy labor below a certain price; buy women's labor for less than men's
"I FLA. STAT. ch. 742.15 (1997); 750 ILL. COMP. Stat. 47/25 (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT.
126.045 (2004); N.H REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160
(Michie 2004).
181 ARiz. REV. STAT. § 25-218 (2000); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (2002); N.Y. DoM.
REL. LAW § 124 (McKinney 1999); N.D. CEr. CODE § 14-18-05 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-204 (2003).
182 See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E. 2d 790 (Mass. 1998); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227
(N.J. 1988); Frank v. Hall, 1988 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 30; Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc.
v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986); but cf Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776
(Cal. 1993) (interpreting statute to the effect that donor mother, and not birth mother, is
"natural mother" under the statute, upholding surrogacy contract).
183 Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 1238.
186 Id. at 1240.
187 Id. at 1245.
ss Id. at 1248.
189 See Sees v. Baber, 377 A.2d 628, 636 (N.J. 1977).
190 Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1249.
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for the same job; enlist children to work at oppressive labor; purchase the
agreement of laborers to work under unsafe, unhealthful conditions. 9 ' "There
are, in short, values that society deems more important than granting to wealth
whatever it can buy, be it labor, love, or life."' 9 2
This discussion occurs before -the court reaches the constitutionality of the
contract. Although the court spends substantial discussion on the direct issue
of whether an individual may contractually waive constitutional parental rights,
it avoids deciding the case on this basis, preferring the clear statutory construc-
tion and public policy instead.'93 In the constitutional analysis, however, the
court notes that to grant Mr. Stem the constitutional right of procreation and
custody of Baby M "would be to assert that the constitutional right of procrea-
tion includes within it a constitutionally protected contractual right to destroy
someone else's right of procreation."' 94
2. Comparison of Waiver of Parental vs. Jury Trial Rights
The most obvious analogy between parental rights and jury trial rights is
that recognition of these rights is linked directly to the Constitution. The right
to a jury trial is guaranteed in Amendment VII, while the courts have afforded
parental rights constitutional protection under the Due Process clause of
Amendment XIV. 19 5 Because protection of these rights is guaranteed through
the Constitution, the differences in rationale behind protecting them are
reduced to mere semantics. The rights should be protected equally since the
Constitution does not distinguish between them. The standard for protection of
jury trial rights should be the same as that which courts and legislatures use for
parental rights, a knowing, informed, and intelligent consent to such a waiver.
Using the facts of Baby M case and applying the knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent standard coupled with public policy, the outcome of the case would
not have been any different. Although the New Jersey Supreme Court did not
use the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent standard to render the contract
unenforceable, it did so on public policy grounds.
The surrogacy contract is based on, principles that are directly contrary to the objec-
tives of our laws. It guarantees the separation of a child from its mother; it looks to
adoption regardless of suitability; it totally ignores the child; it takes the child from
the mother regardless of her wishes and her maternal fitness; and it does all of this, it
accomplishes all of its goals, through the use of money.
19 6
Thus, public policy would continue to protect the rights of the mother
prior to the actual birth of the child. However, upon the birth of the child,
public policy dictates that allowance is made for the surrogacy contract. At that
time, the scales tip, and a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of parental
rights becomes a valid consent. Therefore, using D.H. Overmyer as Supreme
Court precedent controlling contractual waivers of parental rights is a func-
tional and practicable method for enforcement.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1255.
194 Id. at 1254.
195 See supra text accompanying note 171.
196 Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1250.
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Surrogacy cases also illustrate that fundamental rights remain superior to
the right to contract. The only states that have allowed enforcement of contrac-
tual terms in surrogacy contracts signed prior to the birth of the child have done
so under a very strict knowing, voluntary, and intelligent standard. Addition-
ally, most courts refused to enforce pre-birth surrogacy contracts regardless of
the conditions under which the parties entered the contracts. 197 As one court
puts it:
Under the contract, the natural mother is irrevocably committed before she knows the
strength of her bond with her child. She never makes a totally voluntary, informed
decision, for quite clearly any decision prior to the baby's birth is, in the most impor-
tant sense, uninformed, and any decision after that, compelled by a preexisting con-
tractual commitment [and] the threat of a lawsuit. . . . Her interests are of little
concern to those who controlled this transaction. 198
These same principles can be applied to a jury trial waiver. First, individ-
uals who enter adhesion contracts never make a "voluntary, informed deci-
sion." Especially in consumer contracts of adhesion, most individuals do not
make an informed decision, so their agreement to the terms can hardly be char-
acterized as "intelligent."' 99 Additionally, once the right to exercise a jury trial
right does arise, the party is "compelled by a preexisting contractual commit-
ment"" to avoid the jury trial. Thus, the at least some of the same public
policy reasons for avoiding performance of a surrogacy contract apply to jury
waiver provisions.
Another principle illustrated by surrogacy contracts is evident in the abil-
ity to intelligently waive a right prior to the need to exercise that right because
public policy is against it. Although courts generally will not invalidate a con-
tract based on insufficient consideration, when an unsophisticated entity enters
into a contract where a right is waived prior to the occurrence of an event that
gives rise to the need to exercise the right, the value of that right is indetermin-
able. For an individual who does not plan to use the right to a jury trial, the
right may not seem valuable at all. Then a dispute between the parties arises.
Suddenly the right to a jury trial becomes very valuable, yet has been waived
prior to the time for exercising the right, often without consideration. The only
explanation for entering these contracts is due to lack of meaningful choice, a
form of coercion, or lack of knowledge, ether of which should defeat enforce-
ment of the contract.
197 I am only aware of one situation in which these contracts have been upheld. This situa-
tion occurred where the surrogate mother has been artificially inseminated with the zygote of
the adoptive parents. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
198 Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1248.
199 One scholar in particular argues that courts should look at the efficiency of the contrac-
tual term ex ante, that is at the time the parties contracted looking forward. Russell
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U.
CHi. L. REV. 1203 (2003). Professor Korobkin argues that contract terms should be evalu-
ated ex ante and declared conscionable only if they are efficient, that is "whether the benefits
of a low-quality term to the seller in the form of savings in production, distribution, and sales
costs exceed the value of an alternative term to potential buyers." Id. at 1283. Additionally,
he finds that "[p]roviding terms that reduce social welfare and make buyers as a class worse
off than they otherwise would be is unconscionable behavior .... Id. at 1284.
2'0 Tanya Feliciano, Note, Davis v. Davis: What about Future Disputes?, 26 CONN. L.
REV. 305, 324 (1993).
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
This principle would not seem apply to more sophisticated parties who
have performed extensive legal analyses in order to determine at least the
approximate value of either waiving or securing a waiver of a jury trial. The
average consumer signing a contract of adhesion has performed no such legal
analysis nor indeed possesses the resources to do so. Even on the off chance
that the individual had the resources or ability to perform a cost/benefit analy-
sis, she would not likely have the bargaining position to negotiate for removal
of the clause or consideration.
Despite these unequal positions at the time of formation, some courts
enforce jury trial provisions because "[t]he Seventh Amendment does not con-
fer the right to a trial, but only the right to have a jury hear the case once it is
determined that the litigation should proceed before a court. 20 1 If this is the
premise, then the right may not be waived because prior to the need for a jury
trial, the right does not exist in the same way that parental rights do not exist
until there is a child.2 "2 Actually performing a knowing, voluntary, and intelli-
gent analysis for jury trial provisions would cure the over-looked ills from
enforcing waivers of constitutional rights.
C. Hypothetical Analysis: An Application
In the example provided, any implicit or explicit fundamental, constitu-
tionally recognized right may be inserted, all to the same conclusion: Public
policy requires a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent standard for enforcement
of contractual waivers of fundamental rights. This is true because the consider-
ation cannot be determined, stare decisis so requires, and fundamental liberties
should not be subordinate to contractual principles.
Imagine a woman who contracts or agrees with her parents and family (or
any anti-abortion entity, such as a religious organization) that she will never
have an abortion. In exchange for the contract, her family gives her the car of
her choice (or any imaginable consideration). Fast forward a few years and
consider the following scenarios. The woman gets married and decides to have
children. She and her husband find out that she is pregnant and she goes to the
hospital. Complications occur during the pregnancy putting her life in jeop-
ardy. Although her life is at risk, there is a possibility that she could carry the
baby to term. Is she still held to the contract with her family? Her family is not
likely to enforce the contract, but what if they did?
Take the same scenario with a different ending. Instead of getting preg-
nant with her husband, the woman is raped. Now can she have an abortion?
Her family wants her to carry the child and give it up for adoption. Is the car,
house, or whatever consideration worth waiving the right before the time for
exercising it has arisen?
The issue here is whether the woman entered the contractual waiver intel-
ligently. Can an unsophisticated party waive the right to an abortion20 3 prior to
201 Marsh v. First U.S.A. Bank, N.A., 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 922 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (quoting
Cremin v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1471 (N.D. Ill.
1997)).
202 If this is the case, the jury waiver provisions could also be termed as unconscionable
under the UCC. U.C.C. § 2-203 (2004). However, this is not an argument made today.
203 Roe v. Wade first recognized the fundamental right to an abortion. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the time to exercise that right?2°4 Undoubtedly, the right is much more pre-
cious at the moment the woman realizes her life is in jeopardy. Under the
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent standard, a court could easily void the con-
tract since no individual would intelligently contract away their life for a new
car, or house, or for whatever consideration. The contract would also likely be
unenforceable as a matter of public policy since society has a high interest in
the lives and health of its citizens.
This hypothetical demonstrates the universality of the knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent standard for enforcing contractual waivers of fundamental
rights. Rather than scattered standards for enforcing contractual waivers of
fundamental rights, a single standard providing greater protection makes logical
sense. However, the standard must be applied to all fundamental rights, includ-
ing the right to a trial by jury.
V. CONCLUSION
In order for there to be consistency and uniformity in the law, the Supreme
Court must enforce contractual waivers of fundamental rights under a single
standard. That standard has been enumerated by the Supreme Court in D.H.
Overmyer and elaborated in subsequent cases such as Lake James as a know-
ing, voluntary, and intelligent standard. This standard is further protected by
rendering the waivers unenforceable if they are contrary to public policy. This
standard allows flexibility for sophisticated parties to negotiate with one
another while preventing them from taking advantage of unwary citizens in
contracts of adhesion.
Due to the increasing use of contracts for daily transactions, it is likely that
additional waivers will be introduced into contracts, such as waiver of notice of
process, etc. Perhaps sufficient protections exist today for some constitutional
rights, but enforcement of some waivers of fundamental rights under lower
standards sets bad precedent for the future protection of our liberties. Because
our society values constitutional rights, greater protection should be afforded
them than general contract principles provide.
Finally, our modem jurisprudence dictates that the right to freedom of
contract is inferior to our constitutionally enumerated rights and recognized
liberties under the Due Process Clause. By enforcing jury waiver provisions
under contractual standards, some courts are unknowingly undermining the
fabric of the Constitution. A single standard for enforcement will help prevent
the unraveling of our rights.
204 At the time of this writing, I am unaware of any case law either enforcing or rendering
such a contract unenforceable.

